Far from the most common and equally far from being one of the more complex white collar fraud and theft crimes in New York, Fraudulent Accosting, pursuant to New York Penal Law 165.30, is nonetheless a serious offense. In fact, as a misdemeanor crime, NY PL 165.30 is punishable by up to one year in jail on either Rikers Island or the local jail in the county where you were arrested. Briefly, you are guilty of Fraudulent Accosting if and when, in a public place, you accost another person with the intent to defraud that person into giving you money or property by means of a trick, swindle or confidence game. Breaking this down further, in order for you to be guilty of Fraudulent Accosting you must (1) accost another person, (2) in a public place, (3) while having the intent to defraud that other person of money or property, and (4) do so by trick, swindle, or confidence game. See Jury Charges in NY Criminal Cases §35.08 (H. Leventhal ed. 1989).
As with many criminal statutes, a definition or statement of elements rarely, by itself, is clear enough to define a crime. To better understand criminal offenses, a review of court decisions is not merely helpful, but sometimes critical. To that end, a recent decision stemming from New York County (Manhattan) is worthy of review as it sheds greater light on New York Penal Law 165.30. In People v. Rodney Watts, 2011CN010203, NYLJ 1202556652476, at *1 (Crim., NY, Decided May 22, 2012), the prosecutors charged the defendant with Fraudulent Accosting after he allegedly sold four tickets to the Book of Mormon for $800. The tickets turned out to be fraudulent and counterfeit tickets. The criminal court complaint (actually called an information) stated that the incident occurred inside 335 Avenue of the Americas and when the defendant met with the undercover police officer he stated in substance that he was there to meet for the tickets. The question before the court was whether or not the information (complaint) was legally sufficient to establish the charge of Fraudulent Accosting. Although the court analyzed various elements, the main two it address involved the definitions of “accost” and “public place.”